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The role of the state in the Great Divergence 
After the series of lectures, a debate between Professor Peer Vries, 
Professor John Darwin and Professor Kenneth Pomeranz in the Lokhorst 
Church (Leiden) concluded the conference on the Great Divergence, which 
had been organised by the HSVL and Leidschrift. The debate was an 
example of global history at its best. It explored the relationship between 
important issues, such as technological development, economy and war, all 
contributing to the answer to an important question: what was the role of 
the state in the Great Divergence?  
 After the introductions were done by HSVL-chairman Maurice 
Hoogeveen and the dean of the Faculty of Humanities of Leiden University, 
Professor Wim van den Doel, the participants of the debate were invited by 






In his introductory statement, Pomeranz immediately used the term ‘Great 
Divergence’, referring to the discontinuity between Western Europe and 
Eastern Asia, which arose between 1750 and 1820. Looking at this 
divergence is not only a matter of looking at initial differences. It is also a 
matter of taking a closer look at the causes of these differences. Although 
these differences were fairly small in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, they had grown by the time it was the late nineteenth century. 
According to Pomeranz, the state did play a significant role in arousing 
these shifts. The European imperial expansion played a crucial role in the 
economy of the homelands. This European policy contrasts with the 
Chinese imperial policy, which pushed more and more into Central Asia. It 
did not see its internal colonies as areas that should complement its 
economic strength, for instance, by providing primary products for the 
main economic regions. Instead, it duplicated old policy, by letting most 
resources flow from the wealthy Yangtze River Delta to the periphery 
rather than the other way around.  
The public financial sector is an area in which major differences can 
be seen. By 1750, public finance in Europe was mainly used to finance wars. 




Its contribution to growth was zero or even negative. A century and a half 
later, public finance was used for many new public institutions, not only by 
creating other kinds of new public goods, but also providing for the 
foundation of new kinds of private goods such as railroads. These 
institutions, together with technological progress, later played a significant 
role in both state building and protecting private interests. 
Darwin pointed out in his introductory statement that it is necessary 
to recognise that the Great Divergence was actually a long process. It began 
at least in the early nineteenth century. Having that in mind, it is essential to 
ask oneself what the role of the state exactly was in that period. The 
question arises whether the nature of a legal regime is a consequence 
primarily of state activities, or is perhaps a consequence of opposing the 
activities of other organised groups within society. There are many 
functions that are evidently performed by the state in some societies, but in 
other societies they are performed by other groups. Taking our thoughts 
about the state to another level, we also need to examine the state in its role 
as an important apparatus. Who is actually operating the set of political 
levers, is an important question to ask according to Darwin. He established 
that the state is, to a large extent, the most important vehicle and instrument 
of social interest. It is also important to discover which social groups have 
been able to assume sufficient power within particular areas of society. 
Some social groups were granted some kind of authority, and were able to 
keep this authority. It is therefore crucial to find out who is actually wielding 
real political and social power within the state.  
Looking at the case of colonial expansion, it is important to 
remember that, to a very large degree, colonial expansion was not primarily 
or initially undertaken by the state at all. In most cases the involvement of 
the state was rather limited. Colonial expansion was primarily undertaken by 
private investors, who sometimes sought state protection, state 
legitimisation or state authorisation. For example, the expansion of Great 
Britain to India, which was seen as one of the most dramatic examples of 
British colonial expansion, remained the domain of a private company until 
1858. It is debatable to what extent it was regulated by and leaned on the 
British state, but at least in form it remained a private activity up until then. 
The state did matter unquestionably, both in a positive and a negative 
sense. According to Darwin, one can say for certain, in line with Pomeranz, 
that the role of the state in terms of public finance is of great importance. 




He was confident that the role of the state did have consequences. What the 
exact consequences were, is rather less clear to Darwin. 
Vries used his opening statement to add some structure to the 
debate. He mentioned that the state is the institution of institutions. In his 
view it would be very awkward to assume that economic growth, or the lack 
of economic growth, would have no connection to institutions because 
resources on their own cannot function. The method in which an economy 
functions is always linked to institutions. Therefore, one has to be very 
careful in trying to define what the state is actually doing and how one could 
measure that. In this discussion, Vries wants to try to get a grip on these 
indicators as systematically as possible. According to Vries, it is necessary to 
investigate the strength of a certain state, by looking at the amount of 
inhabitants, the supply of money and goods and the existence of laws to 
protect the economy. It is also very important to determine what the state 
actually wants to do in its economic policy.  
More importantly, according to Vries, it has to become clear what the 
state’s unintentional actions are. In the end, the most important thing in life 
is not what you intend to do, but what the actual result is, Vries states. 
There were a lot of accidental consequences in the Great Divergence. A lot 
of institutions that emerged in the European state formation process were 
not geared for economic growth. When there was partial economic 
development in the early nineteenth century, Europe had a set of 
institutions that were somewhat advanced. These institutions were 
considerably well suited to give economic development a flying start, far 
more than the institutions they had, or lacked, in China. The Chinese state 
tended to law and order and had a conservative character, whereas the 






After these opening statements, it was clear that the debate would mainly 
focus on a comparison between Britain and China. Also, the participants 
stressed the fact that every participant in this debate should see things 
through a perspective based in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In 
discussing these issues, it is very appealing to look at development and 
growth from a somewhat twenty-first century perspective. In Pomeranz’s 




view, under no circumstances could a Great Divergence have happened 
without the change to using fossil fuels. The mining policy of the Chinese 
state did not encourage the development of mining on a large and capital-
intensive scale. The mining policy in Britain did, which brought them vast 
amounts of coal. Useful surpluses like this, became important for industrial 
development. The same can be said for the development of taxation 
systems. Vries again emphasised his remark on intentions and the result of 
intentions. One can see the same in imperialism: no-one wanted to conquer 
the entire world, everyone wanted to conquer the next village. If a state 
follows that plan of action for a certain amount of time, then that state 
becomes imperialistic. In Britain, no-one actually meant to change the fiscal 
system. However, in the period from the Glorious Revolution until 1815, 
the total amount of taxation that the British state collected each year 
increased drastically. In 1815 this amount was eight times higher than in 
1688. In China, the amount of taxes each year did not increase at all. It even 
decreased per capita. According to Vries, analysing the intentions of the 
state has not been a top priority within the section of global history. 
The debate soon shifted to the intertwinement between the 
economic policies of states and warfare. All participants agreed that a sense 
of insecurity and its danger to social and economic possibilities have proven 
to be important catalysts for a shift in society of different kinds. According 
to Pomeranz this is one of the main explanations of the Great Divergence. 
He stated that the threat of conflict and the protection of the economy were 
important factors in the creation of a system of public finance which could 
later evolve into a system of public finance which benefited other sections 
of society as well. As Darwin demonstrated earlier in the debate, it was also 
the sole basis of economic policy propagated by the state. In this respect, 
the foundation of the eighteenth century British economic policy, including 
its system of mercantilism, was a good example of the two factors that 
Pomeranz had mentioned before. The Navigation Acts were based on the 
fear, that without the restriction upon the use of British ships, the core of 
British naval power, and therefore ultimately British security, would 
collapse. A fundamental question is, whether the state did have any clear 
economic purpose with these Acts. Although to look for a direct link 
between military power and economic success is far more complicated. One 
example of this link is the fact that the British lost their power over 
America. This did not actually affect trade statistics. Therefore, Pomeranz 
wants to look at this with a good deal of scepticism. 




According to Vries, Pomeranz did not pay enough attention to the system 
of taxes in his analysis on the role of the state in the Great Divergence. 
Vries therefore explained that the British had an interesting system with 
regard to taxation based on land that, by definition, was fairly fixed and 
two-thirds to three-quarters of the British state’s income came from excise 
and customs. Here the direct link to mercantilism, internal commerce and 
international trade becomes clear. This system provided an enormous 
flexibility compared to the tax system in Japan, China and India, where the 
state knew that there was a specific amount of people, land, harvest and 
therefore an amount of income of tax that was partly fixed. In principle 
when you equip your tax system for consumption and trade there is much 
more room for manoeuvre and flexibility. This amount of space was even 
increased and enhanced by the fact that the British could have a system of 
national debt. By adding a system of credit, there is even more room for 
manoeuvre. That is why the British could retain for themselves a logistic 
power which enabled them to fight in North America, South America, 
Africa, Asia and Europe during the Napoleonic Wars and still triumph.  
Darwin added that this dependence on customs revenue and taxes on 
consumption gave the state a huge interest in promoting trade, because 
economic and military strength were interdependent. The ability to win a 
war was of fundamental importance in the international system. Without 
military power, economic power would belong to another nation sooner or 
later. Some countries triumphed and other countries simply did not 
triumph. Although it would be quite anachronistic to state that this factor 
fully explains the Great Divergence, it has proved to be a useful idea, since 
the logistic power of Britain was immense. The amount of people living in 
this fairly confined country, its amount of resources and the capability to 
mobilise these resources would be a fair measure to suggest that it was, by 
far, the number one economic power in the world. This in contrast to old 
fashioned explanations in which the Chinese state alone was very influential, 
had numerous taxes and was suppressing the economy. In this new 
explanation the British were doing the same as China.  
Both Vries and Pomeranz agreed with this conclusion, but at the 
same time, pointed out that this viewpoint is fundamentally different from 
the statement: ‘A is rich because it has a large military and B is not rich 
because it does not.’ Vries therefore mentioned that no-one in history 
would say a country is rich because it has a massive army. Looking at this 
from a logical perspective, to have a rich country is to have a country at all. 




In the early modern period, the first people to have a country at all, were 
able to defend their countries and, moreover, were able to increase their 
influence. Countries who did not have clear boundaries went through very 
difficult times in the European states-system. Being a country did not 
explain the richness of the country, but it certainly was a necessary 
condition. Pomeranz added that in the nineteenth century, China had to 
cope with both internal weaknesses and external pressure. The Lower 
Yangtze was crucial for the Chinese economic structure. This prosperous 
and fertile region was basically financing China’s tax-bill. China had a policy 
of bolstering ecologically marginal areas, with population reaching a 
Malthusian trap. Therefore, these ecologically fragile frontiers required more 
and more subsidies. At the same time, all trade between Lower Yangtze and 
the new hinterland regions came to a standstill as the interior developed its 
own handicraft industries and ceased exporting important resources,like rice 
and timber. China’s fiscal income declined and with that their military 
strength declined, because of the failure to create a sharp policy for 
agricultural and technological progress. 
The Chinese situation was different from the one in Britain, Darwin 
added to Pomeranz’s theory. In Darwin’s view, the considerable interest of 
the British aristocracy in progress and their money spending on constant 
experimentation in the field of agricultural productivity, was an 
encouragement for the state to take part in scientific and technical 
developments. In the late eighteenth century though, one cannot speak of 
systematic science with a capital ‘S’. The innovations in the textile industry 
and developments in agriculture were mostly based on trial and error. By 
the mid and late nineteenth century, systematic programs of research and 
development were initiated in Europe, many of them by private 
corporations and universities. These improvements were, to a certain 
degree, sponsored by states and did not have a close parallel in China, 





After this debate, each participant drew a short conclusion. Pomeranz 
pointed out that states did lots of things for lots of reasons and often 
reversed these acts. Therefore, we should be looking at particular policies, 
that had a particular impact at particular moments, some of them 




unintended and others intended, rather than trying to generalise ‘the nature 
of the state’ or ‘the fundamental difference in the orientation of a culture’. 
People, who share the same intellect as Max Weber, have tried to make 
these kinds of generalisations and they were not successful.  
The actual motor for British divergence, according to Darwin, was 
driven by the adaptation of coal used to produce steam in the British 
industry. The role the state in this transformation seemed to be of no 
importance. On the other hand, the role of the state actually was crucial. 
The system of public finance, created especially to meet the military needs 
in warfare, made long distance credit and therefore long distance trade 
possible. This factor contributed greatly to the sustaining prosperous path 
of Britain in the nineteenth century. 
In his closing statement, Vries gave a clear summary of the debate. 
According to him, states at the top level propelled developments in their 
competition for resources and in military, monetary and economic affairs. 
This was, to some extent, not the case in China. The division of power 
between the influential and less-influential was completely different in 
Europe, where the division of power was more equal. Looking at the 
history of taxation, military affairs, technology and science, there was a 
constant competition. Therefore, we should not focus on the state alone: we 
should also focus on this element of competition. We should be very careful 
not to look at the state as a somewhat closed entity. The interdependence of 
states shows that the state in the early modern period was a rather porous 
being. The state operated in a system of states, where it adapted to different 
sorts of circumstances, imitated others and always set certain goals. Only by 
having a competitor, you realise you are not as capable as you think. This 
may be not only an important conclusion of this debate, but also an 
interesting sociological lesson for your private life. With this interesting 
lesson from Vries, the debate came to an end. The Great Divergence was a 
subject that created all in all a very interesting debate. 
